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Abstract
Resorting to an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([6],
[7] and [8]), we evaluate ﬁnancial aspects of an optimum currency area. Our
focus is to appraise the welfare of a country, which belongs to a monetary
union and might suﬀer a speculative attack on its public debt. A default may
b ea v o i d e db ya ni n ﬂation tax on common-currency debt, but this decision
d e p e n d so nm a j o r i t yv o t i n ga n dh a v ec o s t sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hi t . M o r e o v e r ,
the model considers symmetry between national and central governments’
decisions about inﬂation and also describes the loss in international bankers’
conﬁdence towards one country being passed on to another. One of our results
is that, for a country with low weight in the voting system, common-currency
regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to dollarization and may be a
better choice than the local-currency one, as the central bank under the latter
regime undergoes some political inﬂuence from its government.
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31 Introduction
Emerging market economies of Latin America and Southeast Asia accumulated high
levels of external debt in the 1990’s. The sharp demand for foreign credits helped
sustain stabilization programs and strengthen the value of national currencies.
Reversal of market expectations and contagion eﬀects changed this environment,
causing ﬁnancial crisis for some of these economies. Argentina and Russia actually
defaulted, while Mexico, Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong and Brazil experienced severe
speculative attacks.
With this background in mind, we make an extension to the Cole and Kehoe (
[6], [7] and [8]) model on self-fulﬁlling debt crisis to describe an economy for which
there is positive probability of defaulting on its external debt, but also belongs
to a currency union. Under this monetary regime, a default may be avoided by
inﬂation of the common currency, which, however, incurs costs in terms of a fall in
productivity. Besides, the decision to inﬂate depends on majority voting and the
welfare of a country with low weight in the voting system is adversely aﬀected by
antagonistic choices. We also try to evaluate the contagion among members that
results from a loss in conﬁdence of international bankers towards one country being
passed on to another.
One of the advantages of the Cole-Kehoe methodology is to do welfare analysis.
We use their approach to evaluate the expected welfare of a member country of
a monetary union constituted of two partners. We do simulations for Brazil for
the period from June 1999 until May 2001, supposing that it has high and low
weight in the voting system of a monetary union. We compare the results from this
model with the expected welfare given by the original Cole-Kehoe model, which we
characterize as being a dollarization regime, and also to a model with local currency
and central bank under political inﬂuence by its government. Our main result is
that for a low-weight country with dollar debt in the crisis zone, local currency
regime may be a better choice than the common-currency one, even if the central
bank of the country that issues its own local money is being politically inﬂuenced
4by its government. If this dependence is not too strong, the possibility to inﬂate, at
its own will, to avoid a default under local-currency regime produces higher welfare
than the need to wait on majority decision as is the case in the other regime. For the
low-weight country, common currency is superior to dollarization, because under the
former regime it is possible to avoid a default through inﬂation, while this alternative
is absent in the latter.
On a more methodological ground, this paper can be viewed as part of
the literature on general equilibrium with bankruptcy, which asserts that in an
incomplete market situation the introduction of the possibility of bankruptcy can
be welfare enhancing (see Dubey, Geanakoplos and Zame [10], for static economies,
and Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez [3], on inﬁnite horizon economies). The
introduction of common currency can give rise to the possibility of a better
bankruptcy technology through inﬂation than just the repudiation of the external
debt, which can be quite costly.
2T h e C o l e - K e h o e M o d e l
Cole and Kehoe developed a dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model in which
they consider the possibility of a self-fulﬁlling crisis of the public debt occurring. The
crisis takes place when the government needs to renew its loans and the international
bankers, realizing that it will not pay them back, decide to suspend them. Given
this decision, the government defaults, conﬁrming the creditors’ initial beliefs.
2.1 Basic Assumptions
The basic assumptions of the original Cole-Kehoe model are: one good produced
with capital, k, inelastic labor supply, and price normalized at one dollar; three
participants – national consumers, international bankers and the government; one
exogenous sunspot variable, ζ, which describes the bankers conﬁdence that the
government will not default. The sunspot is supposed independent and identically
distributed with uniform [0,1] distribution and the probability that the bankers
5conﬁd e n c ei sb e l o wt h ec r i t i c a lv a l u eπ is equal to the probability of a self-fulﬁlling
debt crisis occurring, i.e. P (ζ ≤ π)=π. The model also assumes a stock of dollar
debt, B, supposed to be completely in the hands of the bankers and probability π of
no rollover if its level lies in the crisis zone. If the government defaults, it is always
total. The decision to default is characterized by the government’s decision variable,
z, equal to zero. Otherwise, it is equal to one.







t [%ct + v (gt)] (1)
subject to the budget constraint
ct + kt+1 − kt ≤ (1 − θ)[atf (kt) − δkt]
and given initial capital
k0 > 0
At instant t, the consumer chooses how many goods to save for next period, kt+1,
and to consume presently, ct. The utility has two parts: a linear function of private
consumption, %ct, and a logarithmic function v of government spending, gt.T h e
term % is the weight of the utility of private consumption relative to the utility of
public consumption. The right hand side of the budget constraint corresponds to
the consumer’s income, after taxes (θ is the tax rate) and capital depreciation, given
by δ.T h et e r mat is essential to the Cole-Kehoe model. It is the productivity factor.
If the government defaults on its debt, then the economy suﬀers a permanent drop
in national productivity, at = α, 0 < α < 1.O t h e r w i s e ,at is equal to one.
The problem of the representative international banker is analogous to the
consumer problem, except that the instantaneous utility excludes the term related











tbt+1 ≤ x + ztbt
6and given a initial amount of public debt
b0 > 0
At time t, the bankers choose how many goods to consume, xt, and the amount of
government bonds to buy, bt+1. The left hand side of the budget constraint shows the
expenditure on new government debt, where q∗
t is the price of one-period bonds that
pay one unit of the good at maturity if the government does not default. The right
hand side includes the revenue received from the bonds purchased in the previous
period. The decision variable z indicates government default (z =0 )o rn o t( z =1 ).
If it defaults, then the bankers receive nothing.
The government is assumed benevolent, in the sense that it maximizes the
welfare of national consumers, and with no commitment to honor its obligations. Its
decision variables are: new debt, Bt+1, whether or not to default, zt,a n dg o v e r n m e n t
consumption, gt. It has a budget constraint given by
gt + ztBt ≤ θ[atf (Kt) − δKt]+q
∗
tBt+1 (3)
where the expenditure, on the left hand side of expression (3), refers to current
consumption and the payment of its debt; while the revenue, on the right hand side,
includes taxes and the selling of new debt. The government is also assumed to have a
strategic behavior since it foresees the optimal decision of the participants, including
its own, ct, kt+1, q∗
t, zt and gt, given the initial aggregate state of the economy, st,
and its choice of Bt+1.
The timing of actions within a period t is (the subscript t is omitted):
• the sunspot ζ is realized and the aggregate state is s =( K,B,a−1,ζ);
• the government, given the price function q∗ = q∗(s,B0),c h o o s e sB0;
• the bankers decide whether or not to purchase B0;
• the government chooses whether or not to default, z, and how much to
consume, g;
7• ﬁnally, consumers, given a(s,z),d e c i d ea b o u tc and k0.
2.2 A Recursive Equilibrium
In the construction of a recursive equilibrium, the ﬁrst step is to characterize the
behavior of the consumers and bankers. The optimal accumulation of capital, k0,
may take three values kn >k π >k d, depending on the consumers’ expectation about
the productivity factor in the next period, E[a0]. When the expectation is equal to
one, k0 equals kn. If consumers expect a debt crisis next period with probability π,
then E[a0] equals 1 − π + πα and they choose kπ. Finally, when consumers know
that the government has defaulted or will default for sure, they expect a drop in the
productivity factor to α and k0 is kd. Analogously, the price that bankers pay for the
new debt may take three values, β, β (1 − π) and 0, depending on their expectation
of whether or not the government will default next period, since q∗ = βE[z0].F o r
example, if bankers expect no default ( E[z0]=1 ), then q∗ is β.
The second step in the construction of a recursive equilibrium is to deﬁne the
crisis zone with probability π. For a given maturity of government bonds, the
crisis zone is the debt interval for which a crisis can occur with probability π.F o r
one-period government bonds and aggregate state s =( kπ,B,1,ζ), such that there






The lower limit, b(kn), is the highest debt level such that the government’s payoﬀ
of not defaulting, V n
g , is greater than the payoﬀ of defaulting, V d
g ,w h e ni td o e sn o t
obtain new external loans (the second argument, B0, and the third, q∗, are zero in




g (s,0,0) ≥ V
d
g (s,0,0)
On the other hand, the upper limit, B (kπ,π), is the highest debt level such that the
government prefers not to default than to default, as long as it is able to sell new




0,β (1 − π)) ≥ V
d
g (s,B
0,β (1 − π))
Given these limits of the crisis zone, if the government chooses new dollar debt
below the crisis zone, B0 ≤ b(kn), then bankers will always renew their loans. If
new dollar debt is inside the crisis zone and the realization of the sunspot is such
that the international bankers are conﬁdent that the government will honor its
obligations, then the creditors rollover the debt and are aware of a possible default
with probability π next period. Finally, if the new debt is above the crisis zone,
B0 > B (kπ,π), then there will be default for sure in the following period and the
bankers purchase no new debt.
2.3 Numerical Exercise
Using their model, Cole and Kehoe [6] did a numerical exercise for Mexico for the
eight months before the 1994-95 crisis. The parameters they used are: an average
maturity of eight months for the public debt; capital share, ν,e q u a lt o0.4 applied
to the production function f(k)=Akν and total productivity factor, A =2 .0;t a x
rate, θ =0 .2; drop in productivity after default of 0.05, meaning α =0 .95; discount
factor, β =0 .97; depreciation factor, δ =0 .05; and probability of default, π =0 .02,
corresponding to one minus the ratio of the interest rate on U.S. Treasury bills and





One result of their simulation is the government debt policy function. For a
given current debt level, it determines the amount of new debt the government
chooses. Another result of their simulation is the crisis zone for diﬀerent maturities
of the public debt. They show that Mexico’s domestic government debt of 20%,
constituted mostly of Tesobonos, relative to GDP and average maturity of eight
months was inside the crisis zone after devaluation.
9We do a similar exercise for Brazil for the 24-month period from June 1999 to
May 2001. The parameters we use are the following: average maturity of public
debt of 24 months; capital share, ν =0 .5;t a xr a t e ,θ =0 .3; probability of default,
π =0 .06; drop in national productivity after default equal to the Mexican one
(α =0 .95); and depreciation factor, δ =0 .24.
The two-year interval is equal to the average maturity period of Brazilian
government debt. We assume that the average maturity of debt denominated in
local currency follows the average maturity for debt indexed by the Selic rate (the
basic rate set by Banco Central do Brasil), while, for debt denominated in dollar is
the same as for dollar-indexed bonds. Both average maturities are approximately 24
months for the period under study. Araujo and Leon ([2], Tabela 3) obtain that net
public sector debt denominated or indexed to the dollar is 0.20 relative to GDP and,
denominated in Brazilian money, 0.30, during June 1999 to May 2001. As shown in
Figure 1, if we make the strong assumption that total Brazilian public sector debt
could suﬀer a run and is subject to the mood of the international creditors, then,
for an average maturity of 24 months, it would be inside the crisis zone.
3 A Model with Common Currency
We modify the original Cole-Kehoe model to assess the welfare of an economy that
belongs to a currency union. The currency union model is mainly characterized
as one with two currencies (the common one, such as the Euro, and the dollar),
I member countries and a central government, equivalent to the Council of the
European Union, constituted as the decision-making body for all members. Each
country i, i =1 ,...,I, issues debt in the two currencies: dollar, Bi,a n dc o m m o n
currency, Di. Since there is debt denominated in common currency, it is possible for
the central government to collect inﬂation tax, but this decision depends on majority
voting.
103.1 Basic Assumptions
The currency union model is very similar to the original Cole-Kehoe model. The
basic assumptions are: participants in the market for the reference good – national
consumers for I countries, international bankers, national government from I
countries and the central government; the price of the good equals one dollar, or pt
units of the common currency, in all member countries; each country i issues debt
denominated in dollars, Bi, which is only acquired by international bankers, there
is probability πi of no rollover if its level is in the crisis zone and any suspension in
p a y m e n ti sa l w a y st o t a l ;a l s o ,e a c hc o u n t r yi issues debt denominated in common
currency, Di, which is only taken up by consumers from this country, there is always
credit rollover and repayment may be suspended partially.
Analogous to the original model, the decision to default on dollar debt is
characterized by the national government’s decision variable, zi,b e i n ge q u a lt oz e r o
and a permanent fall in national productivity, ai,t oαi, 0 < αi < 1. Meanwhile,
the decision whether or not to create inﬂation tax on common-currency debt is
described by the central government decision variable, ϑ
u
t, which may take one of
two values: 1 or φ =
1
1+χ
, 0 < φ < 1 and χ,t h ei n ﬂation rate. If the central
government decides for no inﬂation tax, then the common currency bond pays one
good, υu =1 , as the dollar bond does. Otherwise, it pays less than one unit, υu = φ.
The national government obtains additional revenue by the lower real return paid for
the common-currency bonds held by consumers after the central government decision
to inﬂate. If there is inﬂation, consumers receive φ goods per common-currency bond
and believe that the government will henceforth start paying this quantity of goods
per bond, while country i is aﬀected by a permanent fall in productivity, ai,t oαφ,
which is related to the rate of inﬂation tax chosen. Therefore, the decision to inﬂate
brings a cost to the member countries in terms of lower productivity, despite the
beneﬁt of the extra revenue to avoid an external default. An alternative approach
to include inﬂation cost is to suppose a reduction in consumer’s utility, but this is
still a theoretical proposal.
11Uncertainty is included in the model by three sunspot variables: two for each
country i, ζ
i and ηi, and one for the union, ηu.T h es u n s p o tζ
i, as in the original
Cole-Kehoe model, describes the bankers’ conﬁdence that government i will not
default on its external debt. We assume that ζ
i,f r o mc o u n t r yi,i sa ﬀected by sunspot
ζ
j from another country j belonging to the currency union in the following way: ﬁrst,
we suppose that the probability that bankers’ conﬁdence in government i is below the
critical value πi given that their conﬁdence in government j is higher than the critical
value πj is πi,w h e r eπi is the probability of a self-fulﬁlling dollar debt crisis occurring
in country i given that there is no crisis in country j,i . e .P
³
ζ




and second, we assume analogously that P
³
ζ
i ≤ πi | ζ
j ≤ πj
´
= πij,w h e r eπij is the
the probability of a self-fulﬁlling dollar debt crisis occurring in country i,g i v e na n
external debt crisis occurred in country j. Supposing a currency union with only two
countries, Table 1 and Table 2, in the Appendix, show the conditional probability
of ζ
2 given ζ
1 and their joint probability.
The other sunspot for country i, ηi, is conditional on ζ
i and describes the
conﬁdence that consumers from country i have that the central government will
honor its obligations regarding payment of the common currency bonds. We assume
that the probability that the conﬁdence of consumers from country i is below the
critical value ξ
i, given that international bankers have little conﬁdence in government
i,i sξ
i, i.e. P(ηi ≤ ξ
i | ζ
i ≤ πi)=ξ
i,w h e r eξ
i is the probability that government
i votes for inﬂation tax. Table 3 shows the conditional probability of ηi given ζ
i.
The national government’s choice about inﬂation inﬂuences the central government
decision according to the weight of each country in the voting system, ϕi.I f t h e
majority of member countries is not under a speculative attack, then the realization
of the sunspots ηi for all i is irrelevant, since there is no reason to inﬂate.
Finally, the sunspot ηu gathers all ηi and describes the conﬁdence that consumers
from the union have about the central government decision not to inﬂate the common
currency. We assume that the probability that the conﬁdence of consumers from the
union is below the critical value ξ
u, given that the conﬁdence of the consumers from
12the majority of countries is below the critical value ξ
i,i sξ
u.W e d e ﬁne ξ
u as the
average ξ
i for all member countries according to their weight in the voting system
and it corresponds to the probability that the members vote in favor of inﬂation
tax.
Table 4 shows, for a currency union constituted of two countries, the conditional
probability of ηu given that the conﬁdence of the consumers from each country,
η1 and η2,a r ea ﬀected by the low conﬁdence of the international bankers. The
realization of the sunspots η1 and η2 may be symmetrical or asymmetrical. In
case of symmetry, the consumers’ conﬁdence may be both small with η1 ≤ ξ
1 and
η2 ≤ ξ
2 (and inducing national governments 1 and 2 to vote in favor of inﬂating the
common currency) or both big with η1 > ξ
1 and η2 > ξ
2 (and both governments
voting against inﬂation) . If η1 and η2 are small, then ηu is also small (ηu ≤ ξ
u).
The conditional probability that ηu ≤ ξ
u,g i v e nt h a tη1 and η2 are symmetrical, is
ξ
u, which is deﬁned as the weighted average of ξ
1 and ξ
2, as shown in cell (1,1) of
T a b l e4 . I nc a s eo fa s y m m e t r y ,w ea s s u m et h a tc o u n t r y1h a st h eh i g h e s tw e i g h t
in the voting system and, consequently, the union’s conﬁdence reﬂects the one from
c o u n t r y1 .A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sh y p o t h e s i s ,ξ
uu is deﬁned as the conditional probability
that the union’s conﬁdence is small, ηu ≤ ξ
u,g i v e nt h a tt h ec o n s u m e r s ’c o n ﬁdence
from country 1 is also small, η1 ≤ ξ
1, and from country 2 is big, η2 > ξ
2.O nt h e
other hand, (1 − ξ
uu) is the conditional probability that the union’s conﬁdence is
big when the consumers’ conﬁdence from country 1 is big and, from country 2, is
small .
Table 5 presents the joint probability of the three sunspots η1, η2 and ηu.T h e
probability si refers to the joint probability of symmetry (s) between η1 and η2 and
inﬂation (i), sni refers to symmetry (s) and no inﬂation (ni). Analogously, we deﬁne
the probabilities asi and asni,f o rt h ec a s eo fa s y m m e t r y( a).
The diﬀerent realizations of ηi for each country correspond to the political risk
that national government i faces in adopting a common currency. The realization
of the sunspot variables ηi and ηu indicates whether the government of country i
13and the central government are in harmony regarding price versus output stability.
Antagonistic types of national governments can result in diﬀerent preferences
regarding the conduct of common monetary policy. This same question is analyzed
by Alesina and Grilli [1], but using a diﬀerent theoretical approach.
Figure 2 is a tree diagram for two countries in a currency union in one period.
The branches of the tree indicate the probabilities that the market participants face
before realization of the sunspot variables, when the initial state is such that there
has not been inﬂation tax and both countries may default on their dollar debts.
3.2 Description of Participants
At time t, the representative consumer from country i maximizes the expected utility,




































t, the representative consumer from country i chooses the amount
of new common-currency debt, di
t+1. The common-currency debt consists of
zero-coupon bonds maturing in one period that pay one unit of the good if there
is no inﬂation. Otherwise, it pays φ units. The right-hand side of the budget
constraint includes the expenditure on new common currency debt, qi
tdi
t+1,a n dt h e




also assume that the consumer holds an amount di
0 of the common-currency debt
initially.
International bankers maximize the expected utility given by the expression (2),
















which includes purchase and redemption of dollar debt of the I member countries.
Each banker chooses dollar-denominated bonds of country i at time t, bi
t+1,a n dp a y s
q∗i
t goods per bond. Initially, external creditors hold the amount bi
0 of dollar debt of
each country i.
14At time t, the national government of country i makes the following choices: new
dollar debt, Bi
t+1, new common-currency debt, Di
t+1, whether or not to default on
its dollar debt, zi
t, and current government consumption, gi
t. The budget constraint










































































where (1 − ϑ
u
t)Di
t refers to the additional revenue that the national government i
obtains by the lower real return of the common-currency debt held by consumers.
Finally, the central government is also assumed benevolent, since maximizes the
welfare of the consumers from the union. It decides whether or not to inﬂate the
common-currency debt, ϑ
u
t, which depends on the decisions of the member countries
and their relative inﬂuence in the voting system, ϕi, i =1 ,...,I.I ft h es u mo ft h e
weights of the countries that do not wish to inﬂate the common currency is greater
than, for example, two-thirds of the total votes, then the central government chooses
ϑ
u =1 . Otherwise, it chooses ϑ
u = φ.W ed on o tm o d e lh o wt h ei n ﬂation φ is chosen.
At the initial period, for each country i, the supply of dollar debt Bi
0 is equal to
the demand for this debt, bi
0; the supply of common-currency debt Di
0 is equal to
the demand for this type of debt, di
0; and the aggregate capital stock per worker,
Ki
0, is equal to the individual capital stock, ki
0.
3.2.1 Timing of actions within a period for country i
• the sunspot variables ζ
i, ηi and ηu are realized and the aggregate state of






• the government of country i, taking the dollar-bond price schedule q∗i = q∗i(si,
B0i) as given, chooses the new dollar debt, B0i;
• the international bankers, taking q∗i and ϑ
u as given, choose whether to
purchase B0i, i =1 , ..., I;
15• the government of country i, taking the common-currency-bond price schedule,
qi = qi(si, B01, ..., B0I) as given, chooses the new common-currency debt, D0i;
• consumers, considering q∗i, qi and ϑ
u as given, decide whether to acquire D0i;
• the central government decides whether or not to inﬂate the common currency,
ϑ
u and national government i decides whether or not to default on its dollar
debts, zi, and its current consumption, gi;
• consumers, taking ai = ai(si,zi,ϑ
u)a sg i v e n ,c h o o s eci and k0i.
3.3 A Recursive Equilibrium
F o l l o w i n gt h eC o l e - K e h o em o d e l ,w ed e ﬁne a recursive equilibrium for one country
belonging to a currency union constituted of two partners. We assume that one
of the countries has the highest weight in the voting system, ϕ1 > 0.5, and call it
country 1. The highest weight means that its choice is actually the decision of the
central government. The other country with weight (1 − ϕ1) is named country 2.
Our purpose is to deﬁne a recursive equilibrium and do welfare analysis for both
countries. First, we describe the behavior of consumers and bankers.
Consumers




t when making their decisions as to ci
t
and ki
t+1 and take these variables as given when deciding on di
t+1. The optimization























































































16The ﬁrst order condition for capital accumulation is the same as in the original
Cole-Kehoe model, given production function f (k)=Akν. It depends on the
























νi − 1 (6)










For consumers from country 1, the possible choices of capital accumulation
are kπξu
, kπφ, knφ, kd and kn and of the price of new common-currency debt are qπξu
,
qφ and qn. National consumers from country 1 save kπξu
, because they expect that
the productivity factor next period, Et [at+1],t ob eππ21 [(si+asi)αφ +( sni+asni)α]
+ π(1−π21)[ ξ
1αφ +( 1−ξ
1)α]+( 1− π),w h e r eπ is the probability of default from








is ππ21 [(si+asi)φ +( sni+asni)] + π(1−π21)[ ξ
1φ +
(1−ξ
1)] + (1 − π).T h ec h o i c eo fkπξu
and qπξu
i sr e l a t e dt oa ni n i t i a ls t a t ei nw h i c h
it is possible that one or both countries default on the dollar debt or that a default
c a nb ea v o i d e dt h r o u g ha ni n ﬂation tax on common-currency debt (the initial state
in Figure 2). In the same fashion, consumers decide on kπφ when there has been
inﬂation tax and it is possible that country 1 defaults on the dollar debt next period.
Consequently, Et[at+1]=( 1− π)αφ + π1α, meaning that the productivity factor is
maintained at αφ if sunspot ζ
1 is such that international bankers renew their loans,
or falls to α otherwise. If the central government decides to inﬂate, then consumers
pay qφ,d e ﬁned as βφ, for new common-currency debt from then on, regardless of
t h er e a l i z a t i o no ft h es u n s p o tζ
1. The expectation on productivity associated with
capital levels knφ, kd and kn are αφ, α and 1, respectively. The capital level kd is
chosen if the national government defaults on dollar debt. If the private sector is
conﬁdent that the government will not default, then they select knφ or kn.I nc a s e
17there had been inﬂation tax, knφ is the one picked, otherwise, they choose kn and
pay price qn,d e ﬁned as β, for new common-currency bonds.
For consumers from country 2, the possible choices of optimal capital are: kππ2ξu
,
kπξ1
, kππ21φ, kπ2φ, knφ, knφn
, kπ2
, kd and kn.T h eﬁrst one in the list refers to the
optimal choice when E[at+1]=ππ21 [(si+asi)αφ+(asni+sni)α]+π(1−π21)(ξ
1αφ+
1−ξ
1)+( 1−π)[1−π2(1−α)]. Consumers have this belief when it is possible for one
or both countries to default on the dollar debt or for a default to be avoided through
an inﬂation tax on common-currency debt in the following period (the initial state
in Figure 4). Also according to these beliefs, consumers from country 2 pay price
qπξu
. On the other hand, when it is possible that only country 1 defaults or votes for
inﬂation, then the optimal capital is denoted by kπξ1
, meaning that just the sunspots
ζ
1 and η1 matter. For kπξ1
, E [at+1] corresponds to 1 − π + πsi0+πasi0 αφn
and
the price that consumers from country 2 pay for new common-currency debt is qπξ1
equal to β (1 − π + πsi0+πasi0 φ
n),w h e r easi0 is the probability of asymmetry
and si0 of symmetry between the decisions of the two national governments not to
inﬂate the common currency, given that consumers from country 2 would rather not







The distinction between αφn
and αφ is related to the abatement factor of the
common-currency debt, ϑ
u,a n ds p e c i ﬁcally to the vote of country 2 to inﬂate.
Supposing that the sunspot of country 1 inﬂuences country 2,t w os i t u a t i o n sm a y
happen: sunspot ζ
2 matters or not at present, which depends on the level of dollar
debt of government 2. If ζ
2 matters and country 1 prefers not to default and votes
for inﬂation, then the abatement factor ϑ
u is equal to φ. On the other hand, if
ζ
2 does not count and country 1 votes for inﬂation, then ϑ
u is φ
n, indicating that
country 2 surely chooses no inﬂation.
Given the initial state of the economy s2 = (kππ2ξu






ηu, η2), with a2
−1 =1 , ϑ
u
−1 =1 , ζ
1 ≤ π1, ζ
2 ≤ π2, η1 ≤ ξ
1 and any η2,t h e
central government decides for inﬂation and both countries do not default on their
external debts, as indicated by the realization of the sunspots ζ
1 and η1.T h eo p t i m a l
18accumulation of capital for next period may take two values: kππ21φ,i fs u n s p o t sζ
1
and ζ
2 matter in the following period, with the expectation of the productivity
factor, Et [at+1],e q u a lt o(1 − π1)( 1− π2)αφ +( 1− π1)π2α + π1 (1 − π21)αφ +
π1π21α; or the optimal capital is kπ2φ,d e ﬁned by E [at+1] equal to π2α+(1− π2)αφ,
if sunspot ζ
2 is the only one taken into account by the private sector for the following
period. Again, after inﬂation, consumers pay a price qφ for common currency debt.
Finally, consumers choose kπ2,g i v e nb yE [at+1]=1− π2 (1 − α), and pay price
β for common currency debt, when consumers from country 2 know that country 1
d e c i d e dt od e f a u l ti n s t e a do fi n ﬂating.
International Bankers


































The price that external creditors pay for new dollar debt of country 1 may take
four values: 0, β, β (1 − π),a n dq∗πξu
. For new dollar debt issued by government
2, the price that external creditors are willing to pay may take ﬁve values: 0, β,
β (1 − π2), q∗ππ21φ and q∗ππ2ξu
. If the central government has undertaken an inﬂation
tax and bankers believe that the national government i will default on the dollar debt
with probability πi in the following period, they pay β (1 − πi) for new dollar debt
from this country. However, if the national government currently defaults on dollar
debt, then international bankers pay price zero. In case external creditors are sure
that the government will not resort to a dollar debt moratorium, they pay β.F o r
country 1,t h ep r i c eq∗πξu





equal to ππ21 (si+asi)+π(1−π21)ξ
1
19+( 1− π) and, for country 2, the price qππ2ξu





= π (1 − π21)
+(1− π)(1− π2)+ ππ21 (si + asi). I nb o t hc a s e s ,e x t e r n a lc r e d i t o r se x p e c tt h a t
one or the other country or both may default on their dollar debt or that a default
c a nb ea v o i d e dt h r o u g ha ni n ﬂation tax on debt denominated in common currency.
Finally, q∗ππ21φ refers to an expectation of default of [π (1 − π21)+( 1− π)(1− π2)]




In the next step to construct an equilibrium, we describe the crisis zone using the
following assumptions: (i) there has not been a debt crisis in any of the countries
of the monetary union, nor partial moratoria of common-currency debt, up to the
initial state (i.e., ai
−1 =1for all i and ϑ
u
−1 =1 ); and (ii) the common-currency debt
is ﬁxed at level D.
3.4 The Crisis Zone
T h ec r i s i sz o n ei sd e ﬁned as the dollar debt interval for which the international
bankers attribute positive probability for country i to default on its external debt
in the following period. First, we obtain the crisis zone for the country with the
highest weight in the voting system and afterwards, for the country with the lowest
weight.
Crisis zone for country 1 (country with high weight in voting system)








.T h el o w e r
bound b(kn,D) is the highest dollar debt level, B1, for which the following restriction














where s1 = (kn, B1, D, 1, 1, ·, ·, ·)i sa ni n i t i a ls t a t ei nw h i c hc o u n t r y1h a sn o t
defaulted on the dollar debt (ai
−1 =1 ), the central government has not inﬂated
the common-currency debt (ϑ
u
−1 =1 ) and the sunspots do not matter. The welfare
levels V n (s1, 0, 0,D ,β) and V d (s1, 0, 0,D ,β) refer to the government decision,
20respectively, not to default (superscript n) than to default (superscript d), even if it
does not sell new dollar bonds at a positive price in the current period. The second
and third positions of the argument of the welfare functions mean that new dollar
debt B01 and q∗1 are zero. The fourth and ﬁfth arguments indicate that new debt in
common currency, D, is sold for β. This lower bound is obtained in a similar way as
in the original Cole-Kehoe model, except that in the common-currency model the
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The upper bound of the crisis zone, B(kπξu
, D, π, ξ
u), is the highest dollar debt
for which international bankers extend loans to country 1, given probability πi for
each member country to default and probability ξ
u for the central government to
inﬂate in the following period. It is obtained as the highest dollar debt such that the
following restrictions are simultaneously satisﬁed in equilibrium, given initial state
s1 = (kπ1ξu
, B1, D, 1, 1, ζ
1, ζ
2, η1), with ai





































Condition (8) says that government 1 prefers not to default than to default and also
decides for no inﬂation tax, because the realization of the sunspot ζ
1 > π1 is such
that the bankers are conﬁdent in government 1 and renew their loans. Restriction
(9) says that government 1 prefers not to default than to default on the dollar debt,
21as long as it sells new dollar debt at price q∗1 and new common-currency debt at
price βφ. Under this condition, the realization of the sunspots is ζ
1 ≤ π1 and
η1 ≤ ξ
1, meaning that the external and internal creditors have lost their conﬁdence
in government 1, but it does not default because the central government creates
inﬂation tax.
Crisis zone for country 2 (country with low in the voting system)
S i n c ew ea s s u m et h a tc o u n t r y1 always chooses dollar debt inside the crisis zone,
then the crisis zone for country 2 depends on the realization of the sunspots ζ
1






















is the highest dollar debt for which the following














where s2 = (kπξ1
, B2, D, 1, 1, ζ
1, ·, η1, ·) is an initial state in which country 2 has
not defaulted on the dollar debt (a2
−1 =1 ), the central government has not inﬂated
the common-currency debt (ϑ
u
−1 =1 ) and the sunspots ζ
1 and η1 matter, whereas
ζ
2 and η2 do not. The payoﬀs V n
³
s2, 0, 0,D ,q πξ1´
and V d
³
s2, 0, 0,D ,q πξ1´
refer to the decision of government 2 not to default and to default, even if it does
not sell new dollar bonds at a positive price in the current period. New debt in
common currency is sold for qπξ1
. The characterization of both payoﬀsi sa v a i l a b l e
upon request.
The upper limit of the crisis zone for country 2, B(kππ2ξu
,D ,π1, π2, ξ
1, ξ
2), given
initial state s2 = (kππ2ξu
, B2, D, 1, 1, ζ
1, ζ
2, η1, η2) is constructed analogously to
t h ec r i s i sz o n eo fc o u n t r y1. It corresponds to the highest dollar debt level for which




























































In condition (11), the sunspot realizations are ζ
1 > π1 and ζ
2 > π2, which indicate
that the international bankers are conﬁdent that both countries will not default on
their dollar debts. They renew their dollar loans to country 2 up to the level B20 =
B(kππ2ξu
,D ,π1, π2, ξ
1, ξ
2) and government 2 prefers not to default than to default,
b e c a u s ei ts e l l sn e wd o l l a rd e b ta tp r i c eq∗ππ2ξu
and new common-currency debt at
price qπξu
. Restriction (12) says that government 2 prefers not to default than to
default, because the central government creates inﬂation tax on common-currency
debt, given the realization of the sunspots ζ
1 ≤ π1, η1 ≤ ξ
1 and ζ
2 ≤ π2.
Accordingly, government 2 would rather not default since it sells new dollar debt for
q∗ππ21φ and common-currency debt for βφ. Condition (13) indicates that it would
be better for government 2 not to default than to default, after the sunspot results
ζ
1 ≤ π1, η1 > ξ
1 and ζ
2 > π2. In this case, country 1 defaults and international
bankers roll over the dollar debt of country 2. In sum, given initial state s2 = (kππ2ξu
,
B2, D, 1, 1, ζ
1, ζ
2, η1, η2) and before the realization of the sunspots, these three
conditions are the ones under which external creditors are sure that government 2
will not default. As long as all three are satisﬁed, then they renew the loans to this
country. These payoﬀs are characterized applying the Cole-Kehoe methodology and
the optimal choices for the market participants described in this section.
3.5 Optimal decisions of national government i
Following the same procedure as Cole and Kehoe [8], we obtain the national
government optimal behavior when its dollar debt is in the no-crisis zone and in
the crisis zone. We do this exercise just for country 1. For the other country, the
procedure is analogous.
Dollar debt in the no-crisis zone after inﬂation
The no-crisis zone is the dollar debt region below the lower limit of the crisis
zone. After inﬂation, the lower limit is denoted by b(knφ, D, φ). Given B1
t ≤ b(knφ,
D, φ), K1
t+1 = knφ and B1












































The expectation refers to the possibility of an inﬂation tax on common-currency
debt in the following period. Since we suppose that it has already occurred, then
ϑ
u equals φ and q is βφ forever. Moreover, if the government wishes no default, it
chooses z1 =1and new dollar debt such that the bankers pay price β and consumers
knφ every time. The ﬁrst-order condition regarding B1
t+1 results in v0(g1
t) = v0(g1
t+1)
and the optimal behavior of the national government consists of holding its current
consumption steady, g1
t = g1
t+1. Hence, if at the start the dollar debt is B1
0 in the
no-crisis zone, then the optimal new dollar debt is to maintain this same level.













t+2 also in the









































































t+1 + β (1 − π)B
1















are the consumption levels of national government 1, when the central government
24decides, respectively, not to create an inﬂation tax and to do it, given that it did
not default on its dollar debt but there is positive probability π o fd o i n gs oi nt h e
following period.
Condition (14) does not result in constant government consumption. It is more
complex than the one obtained in the original Cole-Kehoe model, since we are
considering the possibility of an inﬂation tax on common-currency debt. The optimal
solution for new dollar debt, B1
t+1, given its current level, B1
t, in the crisis zone, is
obtained in numerical form in the simulations.
The assumption of future dollar debt in the crisis zone has to be confronted with
other possible situations. For example, the government may choose new dollar debt
in the no-crisis zone, a sequence of future dollar debts that runs down to the lower
limit of the crisis zone in T periods or never leave the crisis zone. The optimal new
dollar debt is the one that provides the highest welfare.
3.6 Welfare for the national government i
The model with common currency is employed to evaluate the expected welfare of
the national government of country i with high and low weight in the voting system
of a monetary union constituted of two members. The welfare of a country with
low weight in the union’s voting system takes into account non-perfect correlation
between the decisions of the member countries to create inﬂation tax. Since the
low-weight country has to follow the decision of the majority, which is represented
by the high-weight country, its welfare is aﬀected by opposite choices.
3.6.1 Welfare for member country with high weight in voting system
• Dollar debt in the no-crisis zone for s1 = (kn, B1, D, 1, 1, ·, ·, ·, ·)
For dollar debt levels in the no-crisis zone, external creditors know that the
national government always prefers to pay back its debts, no matter what the
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1 − (1 − β)D
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+ %[(1 − θ)y
n +( 1− β)D]
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• Dollar debt in the crisis zone for s1 = (kπξu
, B1, D, 1, 1, ζ
1, ζ
2, η1, ·)
When dollar debt is in the crisis zone, the realization of the sunspot variables














































) is the expected welfare with positive probability
that country 1 defaults on dollar debt or that an inﬂa t i o nt a xi sc r e a t e di nt h e
following period, V πφ(s1, B01, β (1 − π), D, βφ) is the expected welfare after inﬂation
tax on common-currency debt and possibility of a moratorium on dollar debt next
period, and V d(s1,0,0,D,β), after country 1 defaults.
3.6.2 Welfare for member country with low weight in voting system
• Dollar debt in the no-crisis zone for s2 = (kπξ1
, B2, D, 1, 1, ζ
1, ·, η1, ·)




























(s2,B 02, β,D ,q πξ1
) is the expected welfare when sunspots for country 1
indicates possible default on dollar debt or inﬂation in the following period, V πφ(s2,
B02, β,D ,βφ) is the expected welfare if the central government creates inﬂation tax,
and V d(s2,B 02, β,D ,β) is the payoﬀ when country 1 defaults. As long as dollar
debt for country 2 belongs to the no-crisis zone and country 1 has defaulted, then
the private sector pays β for debts from country 2 in both currencies.
26• Dollar debt in the crisis zone for s2 = (kπξu











































































) is the expected welfare when there is positive
probability of default in both countries or inﬂation tax on common-currency debt
next period, V ππ21φ(s2, B02, q∗ππ21φ, D, βφ), when the central government has
created inﬂation tax, but both countries may still default on their dollar debts
in the following period, V π2(s2, B02, β (1 − π2), D, β), when country 1 defaults and
there is positive probability that country 2 will default in the future, and V d(s2,B 02,
β,D ,β), after country 2 defaults.
3.6.3 Welfare when central bank is under political pressure
As with common currency, local currency is used with the subterfuge that the
monetary authorities have some control over monetary policy. In contrast, to the
central bank of a monetary union whose decisions considers all member countries,
we assume that the central bank from a country that issues its own local currency
may be subject to political inﬂuence of its government not so strongly committed
with ﬁscal discipline. Given the ability to inﬂate local currency, the private sector
anticipates that the central bank may create an inﬂation tax despite the absence of
an external debt crisis.
The dependence of the central bank on the political decision of its government
is captured by the probability ψξ that the central bank will inﬂate even though
the external creditors renew their loans. We assume that, before the realization of
the sunspots, the probability that the consumers’ conﬁdence that the government
27will not inﬂate the local-currency debt, given that the bankers’ conﬁdence in the
government is high, is ψξ, i.e. P[η ≤ ξ | ζ > π]=ψξ.W h e n ψ equals zero, the
central bank is independent (denoted as strong) and resorts to inﬂation only to avoid
an external debt crisis, as we assume throughout the model with common-currency.
When ψ is positive, the private sector attributes probability ψξ that the central
bank is dependent (called weak) and practices a monetary policy inﬂuenced by the
government. Political pressure is absent in the original Cole-Kehoe model.
4 A Numerical Exercise
We carry out simulations for the Brazilian economy, as if Brazil were a member of
a monetary union with two member countries. We consider two situations: one in
which it has high weight in the voting system (ϕ1 > 0.5) and the other, low weight
(ϕ1 ≤ 0.5).
4.1 Parameters for the Brazilian Economy
The parameters refer to the Brazilian economy from June 1999 to May 2001.
The 24-months interval matches the average maturity of the Brazilian government
domestic debt, in particular, of bonds indexed by the Selic rate and by the dollar.
The other parameters used in the simulations are: production function f (k)
= Akν with capital share, ν =0 .5 and total factor productivity, A =0 .8;t a x
rate, θ =0 .3; utility function of public goods, v(g)=( 1 /10)log(g)+1 ;w e i g h to f
utility of private relative to public consumption, % =0 .7; drop in productivity after
default, α =0 .95;d i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,β =0 .93; depreciation factor, δ =0 .20; total
common-currency debt relative to gross domestic product, D/GDP =0 .3.
In the original numerical exercise for Mexico, v is a logarithmic function, ln(g).
With this speciﬁcation, Cole and Kehoe obtained positive values for this utility,
whereas our simulations for Brazil produce only negative values for all levels of
the dollar debt. Therefore, we changed v(g) to (1/10)log(g)+1to overcome this
problem, but we still need to do further work on this. Besides, to lessen the weight
28of private consumption, c, in consumer utility, we reduced the parameter % from one
to 0.7.
Public Sector Debt
According to our model, D i st h eg o v e r n m e n td e b tt h a tm a yb ei n ﬂated away
in case of an external debt crisis. In the numerical exercises, it is parameterized
as the internal net public sector debt denominated in Brazilian money. To
exclude dollar-indexed debt, we assume that the fraction of dollar-indexed bonds
in the internal net public sector debt is the same as its share in the amount
of federal government bonds outside central bank. In this way, we obtain that
common-currency debt, D, relative to GDP is approximately equal to 0.30 for the
period under analysis (Araujo and Leon [2], Tabela 3).
On the other hand, the model deﬁnes B as the government debt that may suﬀer
a speculative attack, if its level is in the crisis zone. In Araujo and Leon ([2], Tabela
3), B is described as the Brazilian public sector debt denominated in dollar and
equivalent to the sum of external public sector debt (less international reserves) and
internal net public sector debt indexed to the dollar. For the period under analysis,
its average value is 0.20 relative to GDP. According to the results of the present
paper, at this level, B is below the crisis zone, since the lower limit of the crisis zone
is obtained around 0.38 relative to GDP. However, it would be more reasonable if
the Brazilian public sector debt denominated in dollar were in the crisis zone and
this is the exercise that we do using our model.
In the numerical exercises, we make the strong hypothesis that the Brazilian
public sector dollar debt relative to GDP is 0.50.T h i sn u m b e rr e f e r st ot h es u mo f
internal net public sector debt indexed to the dollar and total external debt (private
plus public, not just public). This assumption ﬁn d ss o m eg r o u n do nt h ep r a c t i c eo f
sovereign credit rating agencies. After the Asian crisis, they became more concerned
about implicit government support of private sector claims (Bhatia [5], p. 23). In
the simulations, total external debt refers to annual gross external debt (excluding
intercompany loans). Using data by Banco Central do Brasil, in billion dollars, it is
29216.9, for 2000, and 209.9, for 2001; Brazilian GDP, in billion dollars, is 590.7, for
2000, and 541.9, for the following year; and ﬁnally, external debt relative to GDP
is 0.37 and 0.39, respectively. Furthermore, in Araujo and Leon ([2], Tabela 3),
public sector debt indexed to the dollar is obtained around 0.10 relative to GDP,
on average, from June 1999 to May 2001. Therefore, using our strong hypothesis,
public sector dollar debt relative to GDP is close to 0.50.
Since common-currency debt, D,i sﬁxed at 0.30 relative to GDP, then public
sector debt (common plus dollar denominated) is equal to 0.80. Such high magnitude
for the Brazilian public sector debt is more in conformity with estimations from
credit rating agencies than with oﬃcial ﬁgures, but our main objective so far
is to develop a procedure to analyse public sector debt subject to a speculative
attack. Additional research on the speciﬁcation of the utility functions could possibly
produce a more reasonable crisis zone than the one we obtained in our numerical
exercise and in this way avoid the hypothesis of government responsibility for private
sector external debt. This is a suggestion for future studies.
Abatement Factor, φ
The abatement factor, φ, is supposed to be a function of the probability that
government i votes for inﬂation tax, ξ
i, in the following way. By analogy with π,
ξ
i is deﬁned as the ratio between the tax rate for bonds denominated in common








According to the uncovered interest parity, 1/(1 − ξ
i) is equal to one plus the rate
of devaluation of the common currency relative to the dollar that consumers from
country i expect. Assuming ξ
i is small, then we can approximate ξ
i as the expected
rate of devaluation of the common currency in country i. The expected rate of











30where ϕ1 is the weight of country 1 in the voting system. We make the hypothesis
that one plus the expected rate of devaluation of the common currency and one plus
the expected rate of inﬂation are equal and, by rational expectations, the expected








1 − φ = ξ
u
As we can see, the inﬂation tax on common currency debt, (1 − φ),i se q u a lt o
the rate of devaluation of the common currency, ξ
u, which in turn depends only
on the expected rate of devaluation in each country and the weight of country 1
in the voting system. To simplify the numerical exercises, we assume two cases
(ξ
2 =0 .75 ξ
1 and ξ
2 =1 .25 ξ
1)a n dm a k eag r i do fv a l u e sf o rξ
1 ≤ 0.5.A n o t h e r
parameter used in the simulations to represent the abatement of the real return on
common-currency debt is φ
n,f o rt h ec a s eo fξ
2 being equal to zero.
Inﬂation Cost
Another parameter to be considered is αφ, the productivity of the economy after
inﬂation. Simonsen and Cysne ([9], p.14) calculate the cost of inﬂa t i o ni nB r a z i la s
af r a c t i o no fG D Pf o rag i v e ni n ﬂation rate. Their equation is
F(χl)=1 .105log(1 + 0.0368χ
0.475
l ) (20)
where F(χl) is the inﬂation cost relative to GDP and χl is the annual periodic
inﬂation rate in logarithmic form. χl is related to the parameter φ (of the
common-currency model) by expression χl =l o g ( 1 /φ). To compute αφ for diﬀerent
values of φ,w ec o m p a r et h ec o s to fi n ﬂation given by expression (20) to the welfare
loss after inﬂation in the Cole-Kehoe model. To simplify the calculations, we suppose
that dollar debt is stationary at b(kn,D). Therefore, for given φ,w eh a v et h e
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n,D) − (1 − β)D
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+ %[(1 − θ)y
n +( 1− β)D]
with s1 = (kn, b(kn,D), D, 1, 1, ·, ·, ·, ·)a n dynφ = αφA(kn)
γ − δkn.W ea s s u m e
inappropriately that the consumer’s investment after inﬂation is kn instead of knφ.
Nevertheless, the diﬀerence between them is small numerically. A similar procedure
is applied to obtain αφn
,i nw h i c hφ




The parameter πi is the probability that country i defaults, given that other
countries with strong commercial and ﬁnancial ties with it are not under a
speculative attack. When we assume that Brazil has more than 50 percent weight
in the voting system, the probability of default for country 1, π, is estimated as the
average EMBI+ sovereign spread calculated by J. P. Morgan. A crisis that aﬀects
international bankers’ conﬁdence in Brazil also inﬂuences another country that is
integrated to it, like Argentina. Therefore, when Brazil is country 1,w ec o n s i d e r
Argentina country 2. Accordingly, π2 is the sovereign spread for Argentina when





and ∆π2 i st h ec h a n g ei ns o v e r e i g ns p r e a do fc o u n t r y2 when country 1 is under a
speculative attack on its dollar debt.
Following the procedure of Hernández and Valdés [11] in a simpler way, a linear
regression model is used to represent the relation between the changes in sovereign
spreads of the two countries, ∆π1 and ∆π2, when country 1 is under an external
debt crisis
∆π
2 = b ∆π
1 (22)
32To obtain the time series for ∆π1 and ∆π2, we consider the second half of 1998 a
time of speculative attack in Brazil. From August 3 until December 31, 1998, the
average Argentine sovereign spread reached 817 and the Brazilian one, 1163,a sa
result of the reduced conﬁdence in Brazil after the Russian default. The regression
coeﬃcient is equal to 0.88, which is approximated to unity in the simulations. For
the period under study (June 1, 1999 until May 31, 2001), the average EMBI+
sovereign spread for Brazil is 801 and for Argentina, 723. Since both spreads are
rather similar, we assume that π1 = π2 =0 .08 in the simulations, in which Brazil is
considered country 1. Furthermore, we regard a tranquil period for Brazil the seven
months before the Russian crisis (December 31, 1997 to July 31, 1998). During
this time, the average Argentine sovereign spread is 447 and the Brazilian one, 542.
Therefore, when a crisis occurs in Brazil its average sovereign spread rises by 600
bps and we assume that ∆π1 =0 .06,w h i c hi st h ed i ﬀerence in averages during crisis
and tranquil periods.
We also do simulations as if Brazil were a small country (country 2) and use the
same hypothesis as for the Argentina-Brazil case. We consider π1 = π2 =0 .08 and
suppose that if country 1 defaults, then its sovereign spread rises by 600 bps causing
an increase in the Brazilian sovereign spread given by the regression equation with
coeﬃcient equal to unity.
4.2 Preliminary Results
The ﬁrst result obtained in the simulations is that, for a given positive risk of
devaluation of the common currency, ξ
u, the expected welfare of a small country in
a monetary union with two member countries is an increasing function of its weight
in the voting system. This result can be seen in Figure 3. The horizontal axis refers
to the country’s weight in the voting system and the vertical one, to the expected
welfare according to the common-currency model. In the simulations, dollar debt
relative to GDP is parameterized as 0.50 and, at this level, the debt is in the crisis
zone either the country has low or high weight in the voting system.
33When Brazil is supposed big (country 1), the change in its sovereign spread under
a speculative attack, ∆π1,e q u a l st o0.06, the regression coeﬃcient is one (meaning
that ∆π2 = ∆π1) and consequently the probability of default of the small country
(country 2) is π21 =0 .08 + 0.06 = 0.14. When Brazil is supposed small (country
2), we make the same assumptions: ∆π1 =0 .06 and π21 =0 .14.W ea l s op r o p o s e ,
in Figure 3, that ξ
2 equals to 0.75 times ξ
1. Therefore, the consumers from the big
country attributes higher probability than the consumers from the small country
that the central government will create inﬂation tax.
The welfare levels for Brazil, as a small country, are represented by the curves
whose weight in the voting system varies from zero to 0.5. Each curve is associated
to a probability of devaluation of the common-currency, ξ
u,w h i c hi st h ei n ﬂation
tax itself and equivalent to (0.75 + 0.25ϕ1)ξ
1.F o r g i v e n ξ
1, the welfare for the
country with low weight in the voting system increases as its weight rises (or as ϕ1,
the weight of country 1, decreases), because of its eﬀect on reducing the inﬂation tax
for the union. For the low-weight country, welfare varies inversely with inﬂation tax,
because there are states of nature in which there is inﬂation, and costs associated
to it, even though the small country does not vote for it. This result is also evident
for a given weight of country 2 and diﬀerent values of the probability of creating
inﬂation tax, ξ
u. As the decision to inﬂate depends on majority voting, which is
represented by the choice of country 1, the expected welfare is lower for the small
country as the beliefs of the consumers from the big country in favor of inﬂation
tax, ξ
1,i n c r e a s e s .
In contrast, since the big country represents the majority decision about inﬂation
and uses this alternative to avoid an external default, we can see that as the inﬂation
tax increases, the highest is its welfare for a given weight in the voting system. Figure
4 provides a closer view of the welfare levels for the high-weight country, the one
whose weight is in the range 0.5 to one. The welfare increases with ξ
1 and varies
very little with the weight ϕ1. Actually, welfare decreases with the weight of country
1w h e nξ
2 = 0.75 ξ
1, as in Figure 4. This result is clearer for high values of ξ
1,a s
34at the top of the ﬁgure. Since ξ
2 is smaller than ξ
1,t h ei n ﬂation tax that the
union chooses, ξ
u = (0.75 + 0.25ϕ1)ξ
1,i sl e s st h a no re q u a lt oξ
1 and increases
with ϕ1. The greater the inﬂation rate, the higher are the costs associated to it, for
given ξ
1. On the contrary, when ξ
2 = 1.25 ξ
1,a si nF i g u r e5 ,c o u n t r y2c o n t r i b u t e s
with a higher inﬂation to the union rate, but this eﬀect diminishes as the weight of
country 1 in the voting system rises, increasing its welfare. On the other hand, the
assumption ξ
2 equals to 1.25 times ξ
1 does not produce signiﬁcant change in welfare
of the small country, as compared to the hypothesis ξ
2 = 0.75 ξ
1,w h e nw ed oa n
analogous exercise as the one in Figure 3.
Another result obtained in the simulations is that for the country with majority
vote in the union, the expected welfare is close to the welfare of a country with local
currency and strong central bank. Meanwhile, for the country with low weight in the
voting system, the common-currency regime is better in terms of welfare than the
local-currency one, as the central bank under local-currency regime suﬀers political
inﬂuence from its government. This result is shown in Figure 6, which reproduces
the same group of common-currency curves from Figure 3.
Under local-currency regime the government decides whether or not to create an
inﬂation tax on its debt denominated in local currency. We suppose that its central
bank is strong when inﬂation is created only to avoid a default on the dollar debt,
while it is considered weak, when inﬂation is used for political purposes. In the
latter case, we say that there is dependence of the central bank on its government.
In Figure 6, the six curves representing the welfare levels under local-currency regime
are linked to the six diﬀerent levels of the inﬂation tax, ξ
1. In particular, it is a
solid-horizontal line when ξ
1 is zero. For the local-currency curves, the horizontal
axis refers to the degree of central bank dependence, ψ,t h a tv a r i e sf r o mz e r ot o
0.20, as indicated by the numbers on the upper row of the horizontal axis. When
c e n t r a lb a n ki ss t r o n g( ψ =0 ), the expected welfare levels under local-currency
regime for diﬀerent values of ξ
1 are close together at the left-hand side of the ﬁgure,
around the 16.83 level. Moving horizontally to the right, we observe that they are
35approximately at the same level as the ones for the big country in a monetary union.
Furthermore, for a given probability of inﬂating the local currency, ξ
1,t h ew e l f a r e
of the local currency regime decreases as the degree of dependence increases (higher
positive values on the horizontal axis). For a non-zero dependence of the national
central bank, the highest welfare is associated with the lowest inﬂation tax to be
collected for political purposes, since the decision to inﬂate in the absence of external
debt crisis decreases welfare. Next, we compare welfare levels of the local-currency
regime when central bank is dependent with welfare levels of the small country
under a common-currency regime. According to the parametrization, the country
with minority voting in the union is better oﬀ belonging to a monetary union than
to have its own local currency when the degree of central bank dependence is high
(above 0.04). A preliminary exercise estimates ϕ1 =0 .14 for Brazil.
Figure 6 also presents a line parallel to the horizontal axis that portrays
the welfare under dollarization, estimated using the original Cole-Kehoe model
with probability of default of 0.08. This regime is characterized by public debt
denominated only in dollars and no possibility to inﬂate it. For the country under
analysis total public debt is equal to 0.80 relative to GDP.
Further exercises aim at obtaining level curves (isolines) for the expected welfare
of Brazil with high and low weight in the voting system. In the simulations, we
assume that in a monetary union constituted of two countries, the weight of the
big country is 0.90, dollar debt relative to GDP is 0.50 and common-currency debt
relative to GDP, 0.30. Figure 7 shows the level curves as they change with the
probability of default and the admitted inﬂation rate of the common currency. The
consumers from the union admit an inﬂation rate of [(1/(1−ξ
u))1/2−1] in percent per
year. For probability of default 0.07, the welfare is highest when inﬂation rate of the
common currency is expected to be above ten percent per year and for probability
of default of 0.05,i ti sg r e a t e s tf o ri n ﬂation rate above 20 percent per year. Figure 8
is analogous to Figure 7 and considers the country with low weight (1−ϕ1 =0 .10).
Supposing dollar debt of 50 percent relative to GDP and probability of default of
360.07, the expected welfare levels are highest for admitted inﬂation rates below ten
percent.
The last exercise compares the welfare levels under the three monetary regimes
(dollarization, common-currency and local-currency) according to admitted inﬂation
rate and probability of default. In the simulations, dollar debt relative to GDP is
0.50 and common- (or local-) currency debt is 0.30 relative to GDP. The welfare level
under common-currency regime refers to a country with low weight in the voting
system (1 − ϕ1 = 0.10) and, under local currency, the central bank is a weak one
with degree of dependence equal to 0.04. The admitted inﬂation, indicated in the
vertical axis, is equivalent to [(1/(1 − ξ
1))1/2 − 1]. To obtain the inﬂa t i o no ft h e
common currency, ξ
1 is replaced by ξ
u = (0.75 + 0.25 · 0.90)ξ
1,f o rϕ1 = 0.90.
The result from the simulations is shown in Figure 9. Three regions come out
of the inﬂation rate and probability of default plane. One of them is indicated
by Common > Dollar > Local, which means that for values of probability of
default and admitted inﬂation rate to the left of the curve marked with plus sign,
the welfare of the common-currency regime is better than dollarization, which in
turn is superior to the local-currency one. The other region, located to the right of
the curve marked with plus signs and to the left of the curve marked with circles,
the welfare of the common-currency regime is better than the other two, but, now,
local currency is superior to dollarization. This region is denoted by Common >
Local > Dollar. The diﬀerence between the curve marked with circles and the
one marked with diamonds refers to the eﬀect of contagion that country 1 exerts on
country 2 that we suppose occurs under common-currency regime. The curve with
c i r c l e si sa s s o c i a t e dw i t h∆π1 =0 .06 and accordingly, the probability of default of
country 2 associated to it is π21 as in expression (21). The curve with diamonds
is linked to ∆π1 =0 . Therefore, the common-currency regime is better than the
local-currency one for country 2 at higher values of its probability of default, π2,a s
the adverse external shock that hits country 1 does not aﬀect country 2.
The above result is in accordance with the following conclusion obtained from
37Figure 9: for a country with low weight in the voting system, the common-currency
regime is better in terms of welfare than the local-currency one, the lowest is its
probability of default on the dollar debt. The reason for this is that the less
the private sector believes that the small country needs inﬂation tax to avoid an
external default, which is captured by the probability of default, the better the
common-currency regime is. The decision to inﬂate depends on majority vote.
Therefore, country 2 can not use the inﬂation alternative to avoid an external
debt crisis as it pleases, like country 1 does. The third region is indicated by
Local > Common > Dollar, which shows that local currency is a better choice
than common currency, even if the central bank of the country that issues its own
local currency is being politically inﬂuenced. This option produces higher welfare
compared to the regime in which the country has to default because the majority is
against inﬂation. Besides, Figure 9 shows that common-currency regime is a better
choice than dollarization. The advantage rests on the possibility of the ﬁrst being
r e s c u e do fad e f a u l tb yi n ﬂation of the common currency, while, for the second, this
alternative is absent.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
The paper brings into discussion one aspect of the debate about monetary regimes
for countries heavily dependent on international lending. This task is accomplished
by means of a macroeconomic model that incorporates microfundamentals, rational
expectations and dynamic optimization.
The Cole-Kehoe model for obtaining the welfare of an economy subject to a
speculative attack on its external debt is the starting point to describe alternative
monetary regimes. The model developed in this paper includes public debt
denominated in common currency, thus allowing the central government to resort
to lowering the real return on it. The inﬂa t i o nt a xs oe x t r a c t e di su s e dt oa v o i da
default on the external debt, whose consequences could be worse in terms of welfare.
Besides, we have taken into account inﬂation costs associated with raising this
38revenue and the symmetry between the national and central governments’ decisions
about whether or not to inﬂate. We went a bit further to describe the contagion that
results from a loss in conﬁdence regarding one government’s commitment to repay
its external debt being passed on to another country that belongs to the currency
union.
The model is used to run simulations of the Brazilian economy for the 24-months
period from June 1999 until May 2001. In the numerical exercises, Brazil is assumed
to belong to a monetary union made up of two countries, as a country with high
weight in the voting system (greater than 50 percent) and also as a country with
low weight (less than 50 percent). When we assume that it is a high-weight country,
Argentina is the other country with strong commercial and ﬁnancial ties with it
and the one that suﬀers contagion from a bad realization of the sunspot variable
corresponding to international bankers’ conﬁdence in the Brazilian government.
When Brazil is supposed to be a low-weight country, we make the same assumptions
and consider country 1 a ﬁctitious one.
The preliminary results indicate that the expected welfare for Brazil, as a country
with low weight in a monetary union of two member countries, decreases with the
probability of inﬂating the common currency, while, as a country with high weight,
its welfare rises. Another result points out that Brazil, as a country with high weight,
has an expected welfare close to the welfare of a country with local currency and
central bank under no political pressure (i.e., that only resorts to inﬂation tax in
case of an external crisis). On the other hand, if Brazil has low weight, the expected
welfare under the common-currency regime may be greater than the welfare under
local currency, as the central bank under this latter regime suﬀers strong political
inﬂuence by its government.
The original Cole-Kehoe model and its extensions allow the comparison of
welfare levels under common-currency, local-currency and dollarization regimes for
a country, according to its probability of default and probability to inﬂate the local
or common currencies. Moreover, the common-currency model could also be used to
39compare welfare levels for a country under two situations: one, in which it has low
w e i g h ta n dt h es o v e r e i g ns p r e a do ft h eh i g h - w e i g h tc o u n t r yi sl o w e rt h a ni t so w n ;
and the other, in which both countries that constitute the monetary union have
high sovereign spreads. These exercises could bring some light to the discussion of
whether Brazil should adhere to a monetary union with the United States, as in
the ﬁrst situation, or with Argentina, in the second one. For Argentina and Brazil,
we have already given a start here, but more eﬀort must be put on improving the
calibration of the parameters. The framework developed in this paper would also be
suitable for discussing alternative monetary regimes in Mexico. A numerical exercise
of the common-currency model would provide, for instance, the welfare gain that
might be achieved if Mexico’s weight in the voting system of a monetary union with
the United States were increased.
Future extensions of the model should be aimed at carrying out simulations
in which debt denominated in common currency is not ﬁxed, but instead results
from an optimization exercise as is the case of dollar debt. Also, political inﬂuence
should be considered in the common-currency model, since national governments
of a monetary union might inﬂuence the central government’s decision to create
inﬂation tax even though it is not the majority’s choice.
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Figure 1: Brazil 1999-2002 — The Crisis Zone for Diﬀerent Maturities










































42Figure 2: Tree Diagram
43Figure 3: Expected Welfare in a Monetary Union and ξ
2 =0 .75ξ
1











































Brazil as high weight country (country 1) 
Probabilities of default:               
1 = 0.08                             
2 = 0.08                             
1 = 0.06 (contagion)           
21 = 1 + 1 = 0.14        
Probabilities of inflation tax admitted by:          
(country 2 consumers) 2 = 0.751                
(union's consumers) u = (0.75 + 0.251)1    
Brazil as low weight country (country 2) 
Dollar debt relative to GDP = 0.50          
Common-currency debt relative to GDP = 0.30 
Figure 4: Expected Welfare for High-Weight Country and ξ
2 =0 .75ξ
1










































Probabilities of default:               
1 = 0.08                             
2 = 0.08                             
1 = 0.06 (contagion)           
21 = 1 + 1 = 0.14        
Probabilities of inflation tax admitted by
(country 2 consumers) 2 = 0.751                
(union's consumers) u = (0.75 + 0.251)1  
44Figure 5: Expected Welfare for High-Weight Country and ξ
2 =1 .25ξ
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Probabilities of default:               
1 = 0.08                             
2 = 0.08                             
1 = 0.06 (contagion)           
21 = 1 + 1 = 0.14        
Probabilities of inflation tax admitted by
(country 2 consumers) 2 = 1.251                
(union's consumers) u = (1.25 - 0.251)1  
Figure 6: Expected Welfare under Alternative Monetary Regimes
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45Figure 7: Level Curves for the Welfare of High Weight Country









































































































































Contagion (country 1 on country 2) 1 = 0.06
Country 1 weight in voting system = 0.9    
Dollar debt relative to GDP = 0.50     
Common-currency debt relative to GDP = 0.30     
Figure 8: Level Curves for Welfare of Low-Weight Country
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Country 2 weight in voting system = 0.1    
Dollar debt relative to GDP = 0.50     
























































46Figure 9: Comparison of Monetary Regimes for a Low-Weight Country













































Common > Dollar > Local  
Common > Local > Dollar 
Local > Common > Dollar 
Contagion (1 = 0.06 ) No contagion (1 = 0) 
Dollar debt relative to GDP = 0.50                       
Local /Common Currency debt relative to GDP  = 0.30 
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